I. INTRODUCTION S
PARKS and arcs are disruptive impulse-type and continuous electric discharges, respectively [2] . Both are of concern within explosion-proof enclosures operating in gassy locations. The discharges emit ultra-violet radiation, which promotes the formation of ozone and acids capable of eroding critical components. Electric discharges may ignite enclosed methane. Furthermore, the heat of arcing raises an enclosures internal air temperature-and pressure, which, left to build unchecked, might rupture the enclosure. Flames would be fed to the mine atmosphere if enclosed methane ignited simultaneously. Dangerous pressure levels can build rapidly from high-power phaseto-phase arcing, or gradually, e.g., when ground fault ,arc current is limited by a neutral -grounding resistor. Insulation is punctured when disruptive discharge current passes through and permanently increases the insulators localized conductivity. High-power arcing close to bare casing or arcing to the casing itself may weaken or burn through the casing if not detected and cleared: quickly. Heat from nearby arcs or from current. through punctured insulation may decompose the insulation, possibly releasing explosive and toxic gases. Such gas may negate the enclosures pressure and flamepath protective limits, which Paper PID 94-07 approved by the Mining Industry Committee of the IEEE Industry Applications Society for presentation at the 11th Intemational Mining Electrotechnology Conference, July 29-30, 1992 . Manuscript released for publication May 4, 1994. The author is with the Approval and Certification Center, Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Triadelphia, WV 26059.
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are based on methane. Federal Regulation 30 CFR; 18.25r prohibits use of such insulation, but identification is difficulty in the field. For the reasons cited, sparks and arcs must be minimized within explosion-proof enclosures. This paper focuses on only one limiting means-assigning minimum allowable electrical clearances, i.e., the allowable distance through air (gas) between oppositely charged live parts.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND The references reveal that arcing is initiated by sparking [2] . Sparking usually occurs between live parts through air (or other gas) when a voltage difference results in electric field intensity (strength) that exceeds the dielectric strength of the gas [3] . For a typical live part configuration in mining equipment, the instantaneous average electric intensity is proportional to the voltage between live parts and inversely proportional to their separation distance. When the average field strength exceeds the dielectric strength of insulation between live parts, breakdown (sparking through gas or puncture of solid i n s u l a t i o n ) o c c u r s .
Due to response time considerations, breakdown voltage varies with the voltage type (dc, ac, pulse) and timing (duration, frequency, rise time). When solid insulation intersects the gas space between live parts, the respective average electric field strengths are inversely proportional to the permittivities of the gaseous and solid insulators [4] . Should both the air and insulation break down, sparking may appear to occur between a live part and a solid insulator surface.
The gas in the spark path is partially ionized. If the live parts are connected across a power source, and the gas is sufficiently ionized, the power source may supply. followthrough arc current. When physical and electrical parameters are favorably valued, the arc will become selfsustained and may continue indefinitely if not cleared.
Since sparking occurs when the average electric field intensity exceeds the gas dielectric strength, and average electric field intensity diminishes as the distance increases 949 1,234 1 , 6 7 0 1 , 0 8 5 1 , 4 1 0 1 , 7 5 0 1 , 1 9 3 1 , 5 5 1 1 , 9 0 0 1 , 2 8 4 1,669 1,364 1,773 1 , 5 0 0 1 , 9 5 0 2 , 5 0 0 1 , 7 4 2 2,265 2 , 6 5 0 1 , 9 6 7 2 , 5 6 0 3 , 1 4 0 2 , 2 8 0 2 , 9 6 0 3 , 6 0 0 2 , 7 7 0 3 , 6 0 0 3 , 2 1 0 4 , 1 7 0 5 , 1 0 0 3 , 6 3 0 4 , 7 2 0 6 , 7 0 0 4 , 4 0 0 5 , 7 2 0 5 , 1 1 0 6 , 6 4 0 5 , 7 7 0 7 , 5 0 0 7 , 0 0 0 9 , 1 0 0 Tables I and II reveal that worst-case data are from point-to-plane electrodes. With or without UV, less of the same type voltage is required to break down the air between these electrodes at any given separation distance exceeding 0.2 mm (0.008 in). The tables also show that less peak 50/60 Hz voltage than 112 X 50 impulse voltage is required to break down the air between any sametype-electrode pair at separation distances exceeding 0.1 mm (0.004 in), except for homogeneous fields with UV (column G, Table I ). In this case, breakdown occurs across the same clearance at the same peak voltage of either waveform. Additionally, Table I data demonstrate that UV reduces the breakdown voltage of either waveform, for both point to plane and sphere to plane electrodes. In summary, the IEC sparking data reveal that the condition for which sparking occurs most readily for either the 60 Hz or 1.2 X 50 impulse waveform, is the inhomogeneous field (point-to-plane electrodes) under UV, i.e., the data of Table I ., columns C and D.
B: Breakdown Voltage Data-Methane Flamefront
The flamefront of a methane deflagration can also be sufficiently ionized to trigger follow-through arcing as the flamefront bridges live parts.. This was demonstrated in tests conducted at the Canadian Explosive Atmospheres. Laboratory (CEAL) in 1973 [7] and at the U. S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) Pittsburgh Research Center in 1982 [S]. Although not specified in the reports, the tests were conducted between 500 and 1050 feet above sea level and at approximately 68° F. (20° C) ambient temperature. Exact sea level will be assumed as the altitude for these measurements, as a safety factor. Critical electrode spacings S 0 , which just preclude initiation of sustained arcing at sea level were correlated with the applied power supply voltages, V a . Low-impedance power supplies with large inductance to resistance ratios were used to encourage follow-through alternating current arcing. The test results were presented in graph form only and are duplicated in (1) and (2). in Fig. 2 were added.
Calculations from (1) and (2) demonstrate how much the flamefront reduces the breakdown strength of plain air at various spacings. For example, at a 1 in (25.4 mm) spacing the average breakdown strength, V a /S 0 is 53 924 V (rms)/in for plain air while only 4722 V (rms/inch for the flamefront-ionized gas. Fig. 1 reveals that flamefront initiation of sustained arcing is precluded at any electrode separation distance for power supply voltages less than the indicated minimums, 1.15 It is not known, but for this report it is assumed that these minimums remain constant for any internal enclosure atmosphere. Regulation 30 CFR, 18.47 limits permissible mining machine maximum voltages to 550 V dc and 4160 V ac. Therefore, the flamefront effect is of concern only on ac mining machines with nominal (typical) rms voltages of 2400 and 4160. Accordingly, curves C in Fig. 1 and D in Fig. 2 do not apply to permissible mining equipment. Also, regarding phase-to-ground arcing, it should be recognized that mining three-phase power supplies are resistancegrounded and the relatively large-ohm neutral ground resistors used represent a large departure from the CEAL and USBM test power sources. Those sources comprised low resistance to encourage follow-through arcing. Phaseto-ground clearances are therefore less critical than are phase-to-phase clearances regarding flamefront-induced arcing-especially on nominal 2400 V machines since the nominal phase-to-ground voltage is only 1386 V (rms).
The curves pertinent to mining equipment, A and B in Fig. 1 and curve E in Fig. 2 , are plotted simultaneously in Fig. 3 . CEAL curve A and USBM curve E (both 12.5 mm sphere tests) should be, but are not in agreement; reasons have not been determined. Comparing curve B (point-topoint electrodes) to curves A and E (sphere electrodes) reveals that curve B is the worst-case recorded data for methane flamefront consideration. Equations -defining Curve B data are (3) (4) 1) Qualifications: It must be acknowledged that since point-to-plane electrodes are worst case according to the IEC and others [9] , it is questionable whether the CEAL curve B point-to-point electrode data represent worst-case flamefront behavior. Also, data of Tables I and II imply, and as will be supported, that larger clearances are required to preclude sparking from a given voltage for lesser air densities (higher altitudes and/or temperatures). It is not known whether air density alters flamefront breakdown voltage values. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that flamefront and plain air clearance requirements are equally affected by the normal steady-state air density in the enclosure.
C. Timing Features of Transient Voltages
A study of references teaches that for sparking to occur the-peak voltage must be larger for short duration transient voltages-than for long duration voltages For spacings that are large relative to electrode dimensions, another timing factor is the time interval during which the transient voltage exceeds the static breakdown voltage sbv, of the. electrodes. Sparking will not occur unless this over-sbv interval exceeds the sparking response (or lag) time of the particular live part pair. The response time appears to vary in a statistical manner and is affected by the condition of the live part material (oxides, grease), the materials work function, the transient wave shape, the transient overvoltage (voltage in excess of the sbv), and the level of irradiation. Although continuous high-frequency cyclic waveforms can cause breakdown at peak voltages considerably less than the sbv, the crest voltage of a 60 Hz wave is essentially the sbv [2].
III. MINIMUM ALLOWABLE CLEARANCE DESIGN CRITERIA
The primary criterion for designing electrical clearances in permissible 2400 and 4160 V mining equipment is to prevent the initiation of sustained arcing by a methane flamefront. It follows that the clearances on these equipments should also be large enough to minimize the occurrence of sparks that might ignite methane. Since the flamefront has no effect on permissible dc mining equipment or on permissible ac equipment with typical nominal machine voltages less than 2400 V (rms), the only design criterion for these equipments is the minimization-of sparks from transient voltages. Finally, the clearance de; sign shall accommodate the normal steady-state air densities in the enclosure.
IV. CLEARANCE DESIGN APPROACH
The design of electrical clearances requires base breakdown voltage data, i.e., worst-case data measured at a base altitude and temperature. Assigning sea level and 68° F (20°C) as the base, columns C and D in Table I , are accepted as the base plain air data, and the points on curve B, Fig. 3 are accepted as the "base flamefront data. Clearance design also requires a means for extrapolating the base data to other altitudes and temperatures. Additionally, the worst-case transient voltages to be blocked (rendered incapable of generating a spark) must be determined. The influence of altitude and temperature on breakdown behavior will be defined next. Then, the transients to be blocked will be specified. Thereafter, the clearance design method may be detailed.
A. Altitude and Temperature Effects on Plain Air Breakdown Voltages
According to Paschens law for homogeneous (uniform) electric fields in gas at a fixed temperature, the product of the absolute gas pressure P and the spacing between electrodes S (i.e., PSI determines the gas breakdown voltages [2], [4], [l0]. It should be noted that since explosion-proof enclosures are not airtight, the steady-state internal air pressure equals the ambient mine air pressure, which varies with the mining altitude. Peek demonstrated that gas density, not simply pressure, along with electrode spacing determines the breakdown voltage [9] .
Accepting that air near atmospheric conditions may be considered a perfect gas [ll] , it follows that the equation of state [3] applies to the air in the enclosure,. where (8) which shows that the gas density is proportional to its pressure-temperature ratio. Treating the quantity dS (in lieu of PS in Paschens law) as the constant for a given breakdown voltage, gas, states 0 and 1 are related as d 0 s 0 = d 1 S 1 ; therefore;
Conditions:
1) plain air, 2) uniform electric field, 3) constant breakdown voltage, 4) near atmospheric conditions. Assuming that (7) applies to any electric field, combining (6) and (7), which deletes the constants M and R, and dimensioning results in the general equation (8) (8) (length units) where F is the internal enclosure temperature (°F), and Hg is the absolute air pressure (in Hg).
An equation from Smithsonian Meteorological 
IEC IEC
C l e a r a n c e B a r o m e t r i c C l e a r a n c e C l e a r a n c e (subnotation h) and temperature (subnotation T) compon e n t s ; f r o m ( 1 2 ) :
Condition: Relative to sea level at 68°F (20°C).
Combining (12), (13), and (14) gives the alternate form of (12) 
B. Comparing (f 0 ) h to the IEC Clearance Altitude Correction Factors
Clearance It should be noted that the IEC Publication 664 does not provide correction factors for temperature [5] .
Figs. 4-6 also confirm the excellent agreement between columns D and E in Table IV .. Each of the curves in Figs. 4-6 is identified by the column number in Table I or  Table II . The voltage data for the Table I curves are IEC measurements taken with electrodes and air exposed. to UV. The voltage data for Table II . curves were interpolated by the IEC from curves generated from the sea level data. Each figure demonstrates that for the same break- 
C. Specifying Transients to be Blocked
Because volt-time characteristics of transients vary from one to another combination of power system-, machine activity, electrical clearances should ideally be custom tailored. The estimated quantity of such combinations dictates a more general design approach. Study establishes that a general design from theoretical consideration alone is precluded by the many complex electrical phenomena involved in the development and transmission of transients (see [18]-1351) . A rigorous general design would require measuring all transients on all machines and categorizing these according to volt-time characteristics and frequency of occurrence. Then, using circuits to simulate the transients, sparking tests would be performed to determine their relative spark generating capabilities. A general clearance could then be determined that precludes all sparking or, e.g., 9.5 percent of sparking. The time and cost for this procedure is obviously prohibitive. Mining transients research, funded by the USBM, was conducted between 1974 and 1978 in joint efforts of West Virginia University, Pennsylvania State University, and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The research included computer modeling of mining power systems and transient measurements at 25 mines and produced a specification, for design purposes, of estimated worst-case mining transients; see Table V [13] , [14] , [15] . Table V lists V t , the transients per unit maximum peak voltages, fastest rise times, longest transient time, and repetition rates, according to the location in the electrical system. Permissible equipment is part of the utilization system. Therefore, for permissible three-phase ac equipment, Table V parts. The listed worst-case dc system peak transient voltage is 4 V dc .
The utilization per unit voltage magnitudes listed in Table V were accepted as the worst case inby transient voltage magnitudes to be blocked, with one exception. For D. Equating 1.2 X 50 Impulses to the Mine Transients phase-to-phase (ac) live parts, the per unit V t value was To facilitate clearance design, the worst-case mine tranreasoning that the worst-case tran-sients should be correlated to the base plain-air breaksient occurs when two oppositely polarized worst-case down voltage data in Table I . However, due to timing phase-to-ground transients coincide exactly in time on considerations, rigorous correlation is not possible withseparate phases.
out extensive testing. Fortunately, a safe-side approximate 8.14 v PP Line Segment Equation On Figure 7 No. 
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correlation is possible without testing, as will be explained next.
The form of the transients specified in Table V are not rectangular, which is the worst-case form considering the spark lag-time criterion. Sparking cannot occur unless the voltage exceeds the static breakdown voltage (sbv) for a time in excess of the electrode pairs lag time. Recalling that the 60 Hz waveform crest equals the sbv, a simple safe-side relationship is forced by assuming only rectangular-waveform mine transients and zero lag time for all electrode pairs. In this way the crest of the equivalent 60 Hz wave becomes exactly equal to V t , the peak voltage of the mine transient to be blocked. Accordingly, the peak voltage of the equivalent 1.2 X 50 impulse becomes 1.3 V t . Finally, applying additional safety factors equal to 1.03 to allow for 3 percent increase in the nominal power supply voltage and then 1.05 to allow for 5 percent statistical variation in breakdown voltage.
(16).
Table VI calculated from (16), summarizes the worst-case mine transients to be blocked in. terms of the worst-case 1.2 X 50 impulse amplitudes of column D, Table I. To facilitate clearance calculations, Table I , column D data are presented as five connected (safe-side) -line segments in Fig. 7 and the equations that define the segments are listed in Table VII .
V. DETAILED DESIGN ALGORITHM
Having determined the base clearance data, the means for extrapolating base data to other altitude-temperature levels, and the inby mine transients to be blocked in terms of IEC worst case base plain air data, the algorithm for calculating minimum allowable clearances may now be detailed. 1) Table I , column D data or the equations of Table  VII shall be used to determine base plain air clearances S 0 . The 1.2 X 50 impulse voltage value V b0 to enter in Table I or Table VII shall be the value calculated for V t from Table VI. 2) Equation (4), which describes curve B in Fig. 3 , shall be used to determine base flamefront clearances, both phase-to-neutral and phase-to-phase, for (typically) 2400 V (rms) and 4160 V (rms) systems only [strictly speaking, for any voltage exceeding 1.386 KV (rms)]. The V a value to be entered in (4) shall be 1.03 times the nominal voltage V (rms). S 0 calculated from (4) shall be the base flamefront clearance.
3) For nominal 2400 and 4160 V systems, the base clearance shall be the larger of the base plain-air and flamefront clearances calculated from 1) and 2). For all other nominal system voltages, the base clearance shall be the base plain-air clearance from 1). 4) Table III shall be used to correct the base clearances for use at mine face altitudes up to 12 000 ft (3658 m) above sea level and for a specified maximum air temperature in the enclosure. Sea level clearances shall be specified for equipment operating below sea level altitude. 5) Additional factors shall also be applied as follows. a) To guard against bolted or arcing faults involving loosened terminal connections, no clearances shall be less than 0.25 in (6.35 mm).
b) The clearance between an on-board step-down transformers secondary terminal and electrical ground shall not be less than the clearance between its secondary terminals.
c) The clearance between live parts of separate voltage sources shall not be less than the phase-to-ground clearance calculated by using for V pp in Table VI the voltage equal to the sum of the separate phase-to-ground voltages.
d) The clearance shall equal the larger of the directsight electrode separation distance dictated by the minimum allowable creepage distance and the electrical clearance determined from Steps 1 through 5 3). e) To attenuate the transmission of high-frequencycontent transient voltages from transformer primary to secondary terminals, grounded electrostatic (Faraday) shielding shall be used in all on-board step-down transformers [16] . f) Where sparking occurs frequently even though the equipment electrical clearances are designed as specified, or severe transients (however infrequent) are known to occur, measures shall be taken to reduce the voltage levels of the transients. Alternatively, larger base plain-air clearances shall be calculated using voltages in Step 1) larger than the values normally calculated from Table VI.. g) All interior surfaces shall be kept as clean and dry as is practicable. Congress (AMC) [17] . A simple equation, based on (f 0 ) t from (14) and included in the footnotes on Table VIII , may be used to calculate clearances that accommodate higher than. the specified maximum enclosure temperature. The clearances listed in Table VIII are the bases for the minimum clearances specified in a table under 30 CFR, 18.24 [l] . Table IX Tables VIII and IX are the voltage  range specifications: 601-1001 was changed to 601 to 1000; 2400 was changed to 1001 to 2400; and 4160 was changed to 2401 to 4160.
V I . P E R M I S S I B L E E Q U I P M E N T E L E C I R I C A L C L E A R A N C E S
VII. CONCLUSION Electrical clearance design criteria and a design algorithm were derived to preclude initiation of sustained arcing from methane flamefronts and to minimize sparking within electrical-enclosures operating in gassy areas. The design utilizes plain-air breakdown voltage data from the IEC, data from CEAL, and the USBM regarding initiation of sustained arcing by methane flamefronts, and a specification of worst-case mine transients from research contracted by the USBM. The effects of altitude and internal enclosure temperature on breakdown voltages are compensated for by the clearance design. Assumptions relating the data and design equations to conditions not tested are stated. Calculated clearances are tabulated for equipment operating in altitudes above sea level up to 12 000 ft according to specified typical nominal, machine voltages and maximum internal enclosure temperatures. An equation is provided to adjust clearances for temperatures in excess of the listed maximums. Minimum allowable electrical clearances for -atypical equipment voltages may be calculated from the algorithm.
The. minimum clearance values listed under 30 CFR, 18.24 (July 1, 1993) are based on the algorithm described.
Every machine for which an MSHA approval was requested after February 21, 1993 must comply with these clearances.
